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1.1 Introduction
At the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, many analysts view the United
States as the peak capitalist economy—the economy whose institutions
other countries should emulate. With an unemployment rate below 4 per-
cent in 1999-2000—lower than in Japan or Germany or other European
Union countries—a huge federal budget surplus, declines in crime, a
booming stock market, rapid productivity growth, and the integration of
welfare mothers into work, the United States seemingly found the magic
formula for economic success in the new millennium.
A decade or so earlier, analysts saw the United States in a very different
light. In the 1970s and 1980s most viewed Japan as the peak capitalist econ-
omy, whose institutions other countries should emulate. American business
leaders feared Japanese competitors to the extent that they made the four-
teenth-century samurai warrior Miyamoto Musashi’s A Book of Five Rings
(1982) a best-seller on the business charts. Financial experts saw Japanese
banks as the 800-pound gorillas on ﬁnancial markets and wondered if lead
bank-ﬁnancing and monitoring ﬁrms worked better than stock market
monitoring of performance. Labor economists argued that job rotation,
permanent employment, consensual decision making, and other Japanese
institutions contributed to labor market success. Few doubted that Ezra
Vogel was right when he described Japan as Number One (1979).
1
Changing the Guard
The Rise of the United States to
Peak Capitalist Economy
Richard B. Freeman
Richard B. Freeman is the Herbert Ascherman Chair in Economics at Harvard University
and is co-director of the Labor and Work Life Forum at Harvard Law School. He is director
of the Labor Studies Program at the National Bureau of Economic Research, co-director of
the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics, and visiting pro-
fessor at the London School of Economics.The “changing of the guard” from Japan to the United States as peak
capitalist economy raises important questions about the relation between
economic institutions and outcomes. Is there in fact a single capitalist
model that deserves the title of peak economy? Does the performance of
the U.S. and Japanese economies support the notion that in the 1990s the
United States had the right stuff, whereas in the 1980s Japan had the best
economic institutions? What features of the U.S. system enabled it to out-
perform other capitalist countries in the 1990s? How do these features
compare to those that enabled Japan to outperform other capitalist coun-
tries in the 1990s?
This paper examines these questions. Section 1.2 develops criteria to
judge whether any economy merits peak economy status in a particular pe-
riod. Section 1.3 assesses how well the United States ﬁts this position in the
1990s and compares the U.S. record with that of Japan in its peak economy
period of the 1980s. Section 1.4 assesses the features of the U.S. capitalist
model that contributed to its economic success in the 1990s and 2000. The
ﬁnal section contrasts these features with the features of the Japanese
model that contributed to its success in the 1970s and 1980s. The similari-
ties and differences between the institutions of these two peak economies
highlight the difﬁculty of linking with any surety institutions, policies, and
economic outcomes in a changing world.
1.2 Single-Peaked versus Diversiﬁed Capitalism
Behind the claim or belief that the United States or Japan or any other
country has developed the ideal form of capitalism is the notion that eco-
nomic outcomes are related to institutions and policies according to a
single-peaked social maximand. When institutions or policies produce a
single peak in the space of social outcomes, one set of arrangements is in-
deed the global optimum. This is shown in the ﬁrst landscape in ﬁgure 1.1.
The horizontal axis measures institutions along some dimension such as
centralization of wage setting or the role of unions or the state in economic
decision making, whereas the vertical axis represents some aggregate so-
cial output. In the ﬁrst landscape the set of institutions N(for nirvana) pro-
duces the highest output, and every move in the direction of N raises well-
being. It behooves all economies to adopt the nirvana institutions as
quickly as they can.
But there is nothing in economic logic that rules out different institu-
tion-outcome landscapes. One alternative is a landscape with multiple
peaks separated by valleys. Some of the multiple peaks may have similar
heights, so that different institutional arrangements produce the same
well-being, but most peaks are local optima, separated from higher optima
by valleys that make it costly to change. The peak economy might have bet-
ter outcomes than others, but it may not be worthwhile for countries with
slightly lower outcomes to invest in change by going down from their peak.
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levels of output with little cost to changing them. This produces the ﬂat
peak in ﬁgure 1.1. This is a Coasian world side payments guarantee that
whatever the initial property arrangements, the economy reaches an efﬁ-
cient outcome. This diagram predicts similar gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita (other social maximands) within a wide range of institu-
tional settings. Each country can do it its own way without suffering any
economic penalty.
Belief in a single-peaked outcome function is deeply ingrained in eco-
nomics. Models of optimizing behavior assume convex functions so that
ﬁrst derivatives yield the maximizing conditions and second derivatives or
matrices thereof have the appropriate sign for the second order conditions.
Even if individuals choose blindly, persons who pick points around the
peak do better and eventually increase their share of markets. Marxian
analysis also takes a single-peaked view of capitalism, predicting the
growth of monopolies and proletariat in all countries.
There is a case for diversiﬁed capitalism as well, however. Since the end
of World War II, living standards in advanced capitalist economies with
differing institutions have converged. The coefﬁcient of variation of GDP
per capita, measured in purchasing power parity terms, declined over time
among major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries as Japan and European Union (EU) countries closed
much of the income gap with the United States. Comparative advantage
argues for diversity. If Japan can operate a consensual stake-holder model
of the ﬁrm better than the United States and the United States is more
adept at a high-mobility or decentralized wage-setting model, Japan will
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Fig. 1.1 Economic institutions: Outcome landscapesdo better with its system than to mimic the U.S. system, and the converse
is true as well. Game theory teaches us that interactive decision making
creates many potential outcomes, with institutional rules or norms deter-
mining equilibrium (Kreps 1990). This is more consistent with multiple or
ﬂat peaks—diversity—than with single-peak optima.
Finally, there is a third possibility: that some economic institutions are
better adapted to some economic environments than others. Perhaps in-
dicative planning and corporatist arrangements were peak institutions in
an era of mass factory production but are ill suited for an information-
based economy, whereas high mobility and ﬂexibility work better in that
environment than in others. The notion that institutions are better suited
for some environments than for others is a more subtle and demanding in-
terpretation of economic history than the single-peak “X works best”
claim or the “many roads to Rome” diversiﬁed capitalism claim. It requires
that we understand how institutions function in different environments
and how they learn to adapt to changing circumstances. If we are to draw
policy lessons from current successes, this view requires that the current
environment maintain itself for some period of time. The evidence is con-
sistent with an adaptionist interpretation, in part because it affords us an
additional degree of freedom with which to interpret events.
1.2.1 Criteria for Peak Status
What factors might help us determine which landscape best describes
the economics world, and whether the United States or some other econ-
omy represents the economic peak in any given time period?
Table 1.1 lists six factors that differentiate peak landscapes from other
landscapes and that can thus guide any assessment of whether any econ-
omy has achieved peak status.
The ﬁrst criterion for a single-peak landscape is that the peak economy
does better than other economies in sustainable aggregate economic per-
formance. The natural measure of aggregate performance is long-term sus-
tainable GDP per capita or GDP per hour worked. If there was general
agreement how to weigh the impact of outcomes like inﬂation, balance
of payments, unemployment, ﬁscal deﬁcits, and so forth on long-term
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Table 1.1 Criteria for a Single-Peak Economy
Static Criteria of N* as Optimum Dynamic Criteria of N*
1. N* dominates on several key aggregate  4. Large and small movements toward N 
outcomes raise well-being
2. N* has higher well-being in much of  5. N* dominates over extended period
distribution 6. Institutions converge (or outcomes 
3. Near neighbors are also high diverge)output, we could form a single weighted average of those outcomes, per so-
called misery indexes of various forms. But whereas some economists
weigh inﬂation heavily, others weigh unemployment heavily in judging
how well an economy does in the aggregate. In some periods, there is wide-
spread consensus that a negative balance of payments is a critical con-
straint on long-term growth. In other periods, as in the United States in the
late 1990s, many ignore trade imbalances. In any case, the peak economy
must do better on some dimensions of aggregate performance.
The second criterion is distributional. The peak economy should pro-
duce higher incomes throughout much of the income distribution than
competing economies. If one economy produces higher outcomes at all
points in the income distribution, who would not declare it the peak econ-
omy? Beyond that, however, there is no universally accepted ordering of
distributions. Rawls values how the poorest fare; your local billionaire may
value how the richest fare; and political economy considerations make the
middle of the distribution important. My criterion is again vague, simply
that the peak economy has higher incomes throughout much of the distri-
bution. This is a way of saying that distributional factors must enter any as-
sessment.
The third criterion relates to the convexity of the landscape space. As ﬁg-
ure 1.1 shows, N* lies at the top of a mountain, so neighbors with charac-
teristics close to those of N* should also have good social outcomes, and
the more features of the single-peak economy they have, the higher their
social outcome should be. This is the standard calculus requirement for a
local maximum.
The next three criteria relate to changes over time.
Since there is only one peak in the ﬁgure 1.1 landscape, any change in the
direction of the peak—large-scale as well as small-scale—ought to im-
prove well-being. In practice, an economy that chooses radical reform in
the direction of the peak economy ought to see economic improvements.
By contrast, economies that, for whatever reason, move away from peak
institutions should suffer economic losses. This is the requirement for a
global maximum.
Criterion ﬁve requires that the economy with peak institutions dominate
other economies for some period—probably at least a decade or so. Given
that candidates for the peak, such as the United States, are likely to have
high income per capita and that other economies can take advantage of
catch-up, I do not require that the peak economy grow more rapidly than
other economies, only that it maintain an edge on outcomes over an ex-
tended period.
The sixth criterion requires that the peak economy be an attractor in in-
stitution-outcome space. Other economies seeking to improve their per-
formance should imitate the features of the peak economy. That U.S. ﬁrms
tried to copy Japanese modes of production in the 1970s-1990s indicates
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ropean and Japanese policymakers tried to alter the way they regulated
markets in the 1990s in the direction of the United States indicates that
they now see the United States in that light.
In short, economic institutions merit peak status if they fulﬁll the stan-
dard calculus conditions for a global optimum for extended periods of time
and are an attractor to other economies.
1.3 Comparing the Peak Economies
How well did the candidate for peak economy in the 1990s through 2000,
the United States, fare by these criteria? How did the 1980s candidate for
peak economy, Japan, fare by these criteria in the earlier period?
Table 1.2examines the performance of the United States, Japan, and the
leading EU economy, Germany, in the late 1990s, when the United States
moved into peak status in the eyes of many observers; in the early 1990s,
when U.S. economic performance was more uncertain; and in the 1980s,
when few analysts saw the United States as a candidate for peak economy.
The exhibit records data on employment, unemployment, growth of GDP,
productivity, and earnings growth.
The strongest case for the United States as peak economy is its success
in increasing employment—what I have labeled the magnitude of work.
Throughout the 1990s the United States had higher ratios of employment
to population than Japan or Germany and the rest of the EU. If we look
back to 1970, the Bureau of Labor Statistics ﬁles show that the United
States had a higher employment-population rate than Germany and a
markedly lower rate than Japan. Since then the U.S. rate rose by 6.9 points,
while the German rate fell by 4.4 points and the Japanese rate fell by the
same 4.4 points. Unemployment rates tell a similar story for the United
States and EU in the 1990s but show that even in the late 1990s, the United
States had higher unemployment than Japan. Not until 1998-99 did U.S.
unemployment rates fall below Japanese rates. Along with employment,
hours worked also rose in the United States compared to Japan and the EU.
Using the magnitude of work as indicator of economic success, the United
States has a strong case for peak economy in the 1990s.
The economic growth ﬁgures in table 1.2 make a weaker case for the
United States. In the late 1990s the United States outperforms both Japan
and Germany in growth of GDP per capita and GDP per worker, but in the
earlier 1990s, it falls behind both countries. Both in Japan and Germany,
however, productivity measured by GDP per employee or per hour worked
grew more rapidly than in the United States, so that by the mid-1990s out-
put per hour worked in Japan and major EU countries was roughly on a
par with output per hour worked in the United States (Freeman 1996; van
Ark and McGuckin 1999; McKinsey Global Institute 1997).















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Finally, the manufacturing productivity data in table 1.2 show the
United States doing well over the entire 1990s—better than Japan and
slightly better over than period than Germany. The hourly real compensa-
tion data, however, show that even in the late 1990s, the United States had
lower growth of pay than Germany, although faster growth than Japan. It
is the fact that the United States combined substantial productivity growth
and employment growth, rather than its productivity record per se, that
makes it a candidate peak economy in the 1990s. The late-1990s boom in
the United States continued longer than expected (and is going strong at
this writing) because productivity growth associated with high-tech indus-
tries and the “new economy” keep inﬂation low despite the low unemploy-
ment.
1.3.1 The Problem of Distribution
The ﬂaw in the U.S. candidacy for peak economy is on the distributional
criterion. As table 1.3 shows, although the United States is ﬁrst in per
capita income, it is thirteenth in per capita income for workers in the lower
decile of earnings. Not until the thirtieth to fortieth decile does the United
States surpass most other advanced countries in per capita income. In ad-
dition, the fact that Americans work so much more than citizens of other
countries implies that the U.S. advantage in living standards is less than
what is indicated by GDP per capita. Greater hours worked per adult
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Table 1.3 Per Capita Income by Position in the Income Distribution, Relative to
U.S. Per Capita Income, 1996
Per Capita Lower Decile Upper Decile
United States 100 36 208
Switzerland 91 52 168
Norway 88 49 139
Japan 84 39 161
Denmark 81 44 126
Belgium 79 46 129
Canada 77 36 141
Austria 77 43 144
Germany 76 41 131
The Netherlands 75 43 130
France 74 41 143
Australia 73 33 141
Italy 72 40 127
Sweden 69 39 110
Finland 68 39 107
United Kingdom 67 29 138
New Zealand 63 34 119
Sources: Income per capita, U.S. Bureau of the Census (1998, table 1355). Income Distribu-
tion estimates based on percentile ﬁgures relative to median for household income,
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), usually 1991–1992 ﬁgures.means less leisure, so that any welfare function that values leisure brings
EU countries closer to the United States in overall economic well-being.
With hours per worker and per adult rising in the United States relative to
other countries, moreover, the U.S. advantage in living standards eroded
even in the 1990s.
However, the boom of the late 1990s did improve U.S. performance in
the distribution of economic beneﬁts. With a national unemployment rate
around 4 percent and unemployment around 2 to 3 percent in many areas
of the country, the real wages of low-skilled workers rose; young blacks
whom employers had previously shunned have found jobs; welfare reforms
that seemed conservative madness moved many single mothers from de-
pendence into the workforce. Although these changes have not reversed
the 1970s and 1980s fall in real earnings for low-skilled workers, they raise
the possibility that the extended economic boom may ameliorate the U.S.
failure to meet the distributional criterion for peak economy status (Free-
man 2000b).
All told, however, although U.S. performance has been superior for an
extended period on full employment and has been good on one other out-
come, productivity during a period of rising employment, it still falls short
of peak status on distributional grounds.
1.3.2 Other Criteria
According to the peak-economy view of the economic landscape, neigh-
bors to the peak should also do well, and economies that adopt peak-econ-
omy institutions should improve their outcomes. The view of the United
States as peak economy fails these criteria.
Close neighbors refers to neighbors in institution space, not in geo-
graphy, but the United States’ closest geographic neighbor, Canada, is also
its closest institutional neighbor. The 1990s were an economic disaster for
Canada. In 1990, Canada stood third in the GDP per capita league tables,
below Switzerland and the United States, and sufﬁciently above most EU
countries to support the notion that North American institutions gener-
ated higher average living standards than those in other advanced coun-
tries. In 1997, following a decade of economic decline and stagnation,
Canada was in seventh position in the league tables. One interpretation of
the disparate performances of the United States and Canada is that the
small differences between the two countries matter a lot, and that Canada
has just not gone far enough toward the U.S. model. Alternatively, some
argue that Canada suffered from egregious macroeconomic policy. A
broader interpretation, however, is that countries with similar institutions
can do differently in any given time period, a conclusion that rejects the
single-peak view of the world.
In the EU, the United Kingdom is generally viewed as the economy most
similar to the United States, and the reforms enacted by the Thatcher, Ma-
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to the American model. Has this improved the position of the United
Kingdom in the league per capita income tables? No. In 1980, the United
Kingdom was sixteenth in the league tables; in 1997, it was eighteenth (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1999, table 1363). Perhaps the United Kingdom was
not radical enough. Mrs. Thatcher’s reforms never touched the National
Health Service, did not reduce the ratio of tax revenues to GDP to U.S. lev-
els, and left monetary policy in the hands of the government rather than the
Bank of England. Perhaps without the reforms the United Kingdom would
have fallen further in the league tables. But again, perhaps the correct in-
terpretation is that the institutions-outcome space does not ﬁt the single-
peak model.
Outside Europe, the economy that has undertaken the most radical re-
forms is New Zealand. New Zealand deregulated much of its labor market,
freed its central bank from political control, and introduced a variety of
free trade measures. It out-Thatchered Mrs. T. With what result? In 1997,
New Zealand ranked last in per capita income among advanced OECD
countries, with an income per capita 14 percent below that of its natural
partner, Australia. In 1980, New Zealand was also last among the coun-
tries, with an income per capita 19 percent below that of Australia. Exten-
uating circumstances may explain the failure of radical reform: New
Zealand had such serious problems prior to its reforms that absent the re-
forms it might have fallen even further. New Zealand may have screwed up
its monetary policy so badly that its labor and product market reforms had
no chance to bring about recovery. Perhaps—but once more a simpler ex-
planation is that the single-peak landscape vision of capitalism is wrong.
What about the sixth criterion—the predicted movement of economies
toward the peak institutional form? Because there are many factors that
differentiate the U.S. model from others, it is difﬁcult to determine whether
economies are becoming Americanized. In one readily measurable dimen-
sion, the extent of unionization and collective bargaining coverage, they
are not becoming more like the United States. Table 1.4 shows that union
density and collective bargaining coverage rates diverged across OECD
countries between 1980 and 1997. If the countries that moved further from
the United States on this dimension did especially poorly in GDP per
capita, we might reconcile this pattern with a single-peaked world (they
screwed up), but the data do not show such a pattern. Sweden fell in per
capita income, but so too did New Zealand. On the other hand, many EU
countries and Japan moved their regulatory policies toward the American
model, so that on many areas beyond collective bargaining, the United
States does seem to be an attractor to other countries.
1.3.3 Japan as Number One in the 1980s
How good was the case for Japan as number one in the 1980s?
The table 1.2 evidence for the 1980s suggests that the case for Japan as
28 Richard B. Freemanpeak economy in that decade was much stronger than the 1990s case for
the United States. Japan outperformed other economies on all of the rele-
vant criteria, whereas table 1.3 shows that the distribution of income in
Japan approaches the distribution of income in EU countries.
In the 1980s, Japan had higher employment rates and lower unemploy-
ment than the United States and EU countries.
Its rate of productivity growth closed much of the gap with the United
States and brought Japan from nineteenth in GDP per capita tables to
sixth.
Its rate of real wage growth closed much of the gap with the United
States as well.
Japan ran huge trade surpluses and expanded its multinational produc-
tion overseas. Perhaps most indicative of Japanese success was its remark-
able record in the automobile sector, where Japanese ﬁrms and transplants
had higher productivity than U.S. or EU automobile companies. Most ob-
servers traced the superior Japanese performance to team production, job
rotation, and related human resource or personnel policies.
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Table 1.4 The Increasing Diversity of Labor Institutions, 1980–1994
Density Coverage
1980 1997 1980 1994–1997
Declining density and coverage
United Kingdom 50 30 70 44
United States 22 16 26 18
Japan 31 21 28 18
New Zealand 56 30 67 31
Australia 48 35 88 80
Declining density and stable/rising coverage
Austria 52 39 98 98
France 22 108 5 9 5
Germany 36 29 91 92
Italy 50 37 85 82
The Netherlands 35 24 76 81
Portugal 52 30 70 71
Stable density/coverage
Belgium 53 53 90 90
Canada 36 38 37 36
Denmark 79 76 69 69
Norway 55 55 75 74
Switzerland 31 23 53 50
Rising density and stable/rising coverage
Finland 69 88 95 95
Spain 8 17 76 78
Sweden 78 86 86 89
#5 relative to #15 1.6 2.3 1.3 1.8
Sources: OECD (1997, table 3.3), with updates from Blanchﬂower (2000).The other area in which Japan did well was high-tech production. In
1980, Japan produced 53 percent as much as the United States did in high
tech; in 1990, it produced 81 percent as much as the United States. More
than anything, it was the Japanese success in automobiles and high-tech
manufacturing that made Japan seem the country best poised to progress
rapidly in succeeding years.
Few if any analysts saw that Japan had underlying problems that were
going to cause it great economic problems in the 1990s.
1.4 What Explains U.S. Employment Success in the 1990s?
Economies have many institutional features and policies, and different
observers select different features of peak economies to highlight in their
analysis and recommendations. Given that we have relatively few observa-
tions of economies with particular institutional settings, and that seem-
ingly similar economies, like those of the United States and Canada, have
performed differently in a given period, the problem of identifying what re-
ally matters for any peak performance is a difﬁcult one. In the aggregate,
there are more candidate arrangements that could contribute to peak sta-
tus than empirical observations. This identiﬁcation problem is particularly
severe if one believes that performance depends on a conﬁguration of in-
stitutions. If you thought that U.S. peak performance depended on four
factors—ﬂexible labor market, weak unions, deregulated product markets,
and, say, tax and bankruptcy laws favorable to venture capital—you would
have to analyze 24 or sixteen cases to show that in fact all four were neces-
sary.1 Although the lack of experimental or pseudoexperimental data se-
verely limits what we can see, it is still possible to rule out some factors as
contributing to the stellar employment performance of the United States
and to direct attention to factors that are associated with the relevant per-
formances.
1.4.1 Misunderstandings
There is considerable misunderstanding about the institutions and poli-
cies that contributed to the United States stellar 1990s performance in em-
ployment.
Many have claimed that U.S. job growth has consisted largely of low-
level, fast-food-type jobs, of which McDonald’s is the archetype. This is er-
roneous.
Looking at the industrial composition of U.S. jobs growth from the
1980s through the 1990s, there is some support for this argument. Ameri-
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1. Measure each of the four institutions as a 0-1 variable, reﬂecting presence or absence.
With four institutions, this gives 24cases, ranging from situations with only two of the features
to three of the features, and so on.can job creation has been concentrated in the broadly deﬁned service sec-
tor, particularly retail trade, which pays less than, say, manufacturing. But
in the 1990s, when the United States attained full employment, the retail
trade share of employment has fallen. In 1990, 17.9 percent of nonagricul-
tural employment was in retail trade; in 1999, 17.7 percent of employment
was in retail trade. Employment grew rapidly in many high-paying and
skilled service industries as well as low-paying and less skilled industries.
Average hourly earnings for production workers in services was 48 percent
higher than in retail trade in March 2000 and 1.5 percent above the na-
tional average (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000d).
Looking at the occupational composition of U.S. job growth, we see that
the McJobs story has never been true. In 1999, 30 percent of the U.S. work-
force was in managerial and professional specialties compared to 23 per-
cent in 1983. Although the growth of employment was bifurcated, with fast
growth at both the top and bottom of the skill and wage distributions, on
net U.S. employment was more skilled in 2000 than in 1990 or 1980.
The notion that U.S. job growth has come at the cost of falling real wages
and productivity has greater empirical support over the long run, but it
does not the ﬁt the pattern of change in employment among groups in the
United States or the 1990s expansion, when the United States became a
candidate for peak economy. From the 1970s through the mid-1990s, the
real wages of American production workers fell while the real wages of
workers in most OECD countries rose, suggesting that declining wages ac-
count for U.S. job growth relative to other countries.
Examined closely, however, the trade-off claim loses its appeal. The
wages of low-skilled men fell absolutely and relative to the wages of more
skilled men, but so too did the employment and hours worked of the low-
skilled. Women, whose wages rose relative to men, increased employment.
The 1980s reductions in the real minimum wage did not improve employ-
ment of low-skilled youth, and the 1990s increases in the minimum did not
reduce it. Comparisons of employment growth in Canada, France, and the
United States (Card, Lemieux, and Kramarz, 1996) or between Germany
and the United States (Freeman and Schettkat 2000) also show no clear re-
lation across countries in the growth of employment among groups and in
the pattern of wage changes.
Most important, the move to full employment in the 1990s was associ-
ated with rising real wages for the low-skilled. In the late 1990s, as unem-
ployment dropped to 4 percent or so, diverse groups of low-wage workers
enjoyed signiﬁcant increases in real wages. For example, the usual weekly
earnings of men aged sixteen to twenty-four deﬂated by the consumer price
index rose by nearly 8 percent from 1994 to 1999, after having fallen
steadily since 1980. In retail trade, the real earnings of production workers
rose by 7.0 percent; in services, they rose by 6.8 percent, whereas in low-
paying occupations, median weekly earnings of full-time workers rose be-
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cent among food preparation and service workers, and by 3.3 percent
among handlers, cleaners, and laborers (Freeman 2000b). To be sure, the
earnings of the low-paid and disadvantaged did not rise to their levels of
the 1970s or reduce the overall level of earnings inequality. What the boom
did was to raise both employment and earnings of low-skilled workers,
showing that falling real pay is not the magic bullet for increased employ-
ment.
The link between productivity growth and job growth is more compli-
cated. Productivity grew less rapidly in the United States than in other ad-
vanced OECD countries in the 1980s through the mid-1990s, suggesting
that the United States paid for its employment expansion through slower
productivity advance. But output per hour rose rapidly in the United
States during the late-1990s period of expanding employment, reducing in-
ﬂationary pressures and thus helping maintain the boom. Indeed, it is the
combination of low unemployment, a high employment-population ratio,
and rising productivity that makes the U.S. performance so good.
The notion that U.S. job growth beneﬁts from an unregulated labor mar-
ket is also a misreading of American economic institutions. The United
States has a considerable corpus of labor laws covering everything from
hours worked to occupational health and safety to protection of minorities
and women. In the 1990s, Congress enacted new laws enhancing individ-
ual employee rights—the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.
Most states adopted rules on wrongful dismissals that allow employees to
sue for wrongful dismissal in court. Congress twice increased the minimum
wage and rejected businesses efforts to modify the Fair Labor Standards
Act that requires time and a half overtime and to ease “company union”
restrictions on employee involvement committees.
Because the federal government has few regulators to monitor these
laws, the main mode of enforcement has been through courts or by work-
ers’ bringing complaints to agencies. Most large ﬁrms in the United States
face some court suit about employment practices every year. Firms have
found the burden of employment law sufﬁciently large to lead many to seek
private dispute resolution alternatives.
The notion that U.S. employment growth consists of virtual or short-
term temporary jobs is also erroneous. In the mid-1990s, FortuneMagazine
heralded the “end of the job.” The United States was, the story ran, mov-
ing from permanent jobs to temporary work, in which ﬁrms put together
teams for short periods to accomplish speciﬁc tasks, much as Hollywood
producers produce a movie. Employment in temporary help agencies has,
in fact, risen greatly, and there is a growing internet-based industry of 
“e-working,” which means that employers contact employees over the web
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tenure—the number of years a worker is with an employer—has held
steady or risen modestly because women have more permanent attach-
ments to work than in the past. Tenure has fallen for less skilled men, due
to the decline in their job market opportunities, not a movement toward
on-line or virtual work.
What, then, underlies growth of employment in the United States?
1.4.2 Contributors to Employment Success
There are ﬁve important features to the growth of employment in the
United States: institutions and policies that favor inclusion of new groups
of workers into the job market, namely women and both unskilled and
skilled immigrants; modes of compensation that share the beneﬁts and
risks of new undertakings among workers and investors; a linkage between
higher education and business that moves science and technology rapidly;
and ease of forming new businesses and declaring bankruptcy that en-
courages entrepreneurship.
New Workers: Growth of Jobs for Women
Perhaps the most important fact about U.S. employment growth is that
growth has been most pronounced among women. Had the ratio of em-
ployment to population of U.S. women increased from 1973 to 1997 by the
same percentage points as did the employment-population ratio of EU
women, the aggregate U.S. employment to population rate would have
been virtually constant at 65 percent. The biggest increase in female em-
ployment was among married women with young children. In 1996 the
proportion of married women with children less than six who were work-
ing was 63.6 percent—which exceeds the proportion of all European
women, including those without children, working. This occurred without
national day care facilities or with the hiring of a majority of women by the
state, as in some Nordic countries, or with labor laws that give parents paid
leave or other beneﬁts to ease the burden of child care. In addition, the po-
sition of women in the occupational hierarchy improved. In 1983, women
were less likely to be in the high-wage executive and professional occupa-
tions than men (22 percent of women versus 25 percent of men). In 1997,
they were more likely to be in those occupations (28 percent for women
versus 25 percent form men; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999, table 672).
New Workers: Inﬂux of Immigrants
The 1990s were a period of substantial immigration to the United States.
Of the 7.3 million additional persons who obtained jobs from 1990 to 1997,
nearly half (3.5 million or 48 percent) were immigrants who entered the
country from 1990 to 1997 (comparable to the early 1900s). The immi-
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and Latin America, tend to have levels of education far below those of
Americans, and they ﬁll unskilled jobs at relatively low U.S. wages, but at
wages far above what they could make in their native country. Others,
largely from Asia, Europe, and Canada, are highly skilled and contribute
to the U.S. higher education and high-tech sectors. Industry has pushed for
special visas for some of these immigrants to alleviate alleged skill short-
ages. As immigrants have become increasingly important in science and
engineering, the best and brightest young Americans have moved into
business careers. Although we do not know the extent, if any, to which the
inﬂux of immigrants spurred U.S. economic success in the 1990s, the inﬂux
has been a major part of the employment growth story.
New Businesses: Venture Capital and Bankruptcies
In the United States it is relatively easy to form new ventures (even if they
are not dotcoms), and it is relatively easy to go bankrupt and suffer no ma-
jor stigma: If you are energetic and have a good idea, you can start up
again. In the 1990s there were over 150,000 new business starts per year,
and about half as many business failures (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999,
table 885). Between 1990 and 1998, the number of business bankruptcy
cases averaged over 50,000 a year, while the number of personal bankrupt-
cies more than doubled to over 1.3 million. But perhaps the most impor-
tant statistic is that venture capital commitments increased from 4 billion
dollars in 1993 to 47 billion dollars in 1997. There was a veritable gold rush
mentality in exploiting the new Internet and related information technol-
ogy (IT) and biotechnological advances.
New Modes of Pay: Shared Capitalist Compensation
During the 1980s and 1990s, the United States greatly increased the ex-
tent to which workers were paid through some form of ﬁnancial sharing of
company rewards, so that by the mid-1990s about one-half of the U.S. work
force received compensation related to company performance (Dube and
Freeman 2000). Table 1.5 shows that approximately 25 percent of the
private-sector work force had a stake in their ﬁrm through some form of
ownership—8 percent had employee stock ownership plans, another 8
percent had an all-employee stock option plan, about 10 percent had a
substantial proportion of their retirement funds invested in company
stocks, and another 8 percent or so buy shares at a discount from the ﬁrm.
A quarter of the work force was covered by proﬁt or gain sharing. In 1998,
55 million workers were covered by a deﬁned contribution private pension
plan, giving them a stake in the performance of the economy outside their
own ﬁrm. In principle, by making pay more variable, these modes of com-
pensation should reduce the variability of employment. Perhaps more im-
portant, the shared modes of pay have been accompanied by increased
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teams, which should improve productivity.
The Higher Education-Industry Link
Higher education is more closely linked to industry in the United States
than in most countries, and this has helped the United States apply ad-
vanced technology to the economy, with consequences for employment
and earnings. As business opportunities have blossomed, top American
students have chosen business careers in place of academic work. The
United States has also positioned itself to allocate resources to other im-
portant areas of scientiﬁc and technological progress. Biotechnology, in-
cluding genetically modiﬁed food, which many in the EU deplore, and nan-
otechnology have the potential to be the technological breakthroughs of
the twenty-ﬁrst century, with impacts on employment, productivity, and
wages. The federal government has allocated half a billion dollars to re-
search and development in this area (National Science and Technology
Council 2000).
1.5 Conclusion: U.S. versus Japanese Peak Economy Institutions
There are some similarities in the institutions, policies, and economic de-
velopments that made the United States the 1990s’ peak economy and
those that made Japan the 1980s’ peak economy. The most notable simi-
larity is in the importance of variable pay. In the 1980s, Japan used bonuses
as a form of variable pay, with the amount of bonuses rising in booms and
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Table 1.5 Estimates of the Percentage of Employees with Pay Related to
Company/Group Performance
Basis Percentage
Worker Representation and Participation Survey 54
Diverse surveys of programs 45
Stock ownership programs  25
Proﬁt-gain-sharing  25
Deﬁned contribution pensions invested heavily 
in company stock  11
Source: Dube and Freeman (2000).
Notes: If workers were covered by only one form of variable pay, our estimate would be the
sum of the estimates for the bold categories in the table: 61 percent, of which 50 percentage
points consists of ownership and incentive pay. But there is considerable overlap in coverage.
On the basis of overlaps in the Worker Representation and Participation Survey,I estimate that
the proportion of workers with any form of performance pay and ownership exceeds the sum
of the proportions covered by each form separately by 33 percent = (41.9 + 29.6)/53.8. Thus,
I reduce the 50 percent to 38 percent. I do not have data on the overlap with the estimated 11
percent of workers with 401k or other plans with sizable amounts of company shares, but I
anticipate that this will be modest, giving the 45 percent in the text.falling in recessions (Freeman and Weitzman 1987). As pointed out above,
the United States also moved heavily into variable pay in the 1990s. In prin-
ciple, variable pay should increase employment and reduce ﬂuctuations in
employment, and it thus may have contributed to the peak performance of
both economies in the two periods. Both countries have also had declines
in their rate of unionization (see table 1.4), and both countries have sub-
stantially invested in high-tech industries.
But the differences between the United States and Japan are more strik-
ing. Employment in the United States is ﬂexible, with workers changing
jobs frequently in their early career years. By contrast, Japanese workers
often ﬁnd permanent employment with the ﬁrm they join immediately af-
ter school. The U.S. employment growth has been women and immigrant
dominated. Japan has not made great use of its female work force and has
never encouraged immigration even with very low unemployment. U.S.
earnings inequality is high, whereas Japan looks more like an EU country
than the United States in terms of earnings inequality (table 1.3). The
United States encourages new businesses and has lenient bankruptcy laws
and freedom of dismissal for economic reasons. By contrast, the Japanese
government has often helped companies maintain employment with sub-
sidies. At the macro level, the differences are even more remarkable. Japan
saves and invests and runs trade surpluses. By contrast, U.S. expansion in
the late 1990s was spurred by an increase in private domestic debt and a
massive trade deﬁcit.
In short, the overall picture is that these are economies with very differ-
ent institutions, policies, and roads to full employment. What, then, ex-
plains Japan’s peak economy performance in the 1980s and the United
States peak performance in the 1990s? How should we understand the
“changing of the guard”?
Two hypotheses ﬁt this experience. The diverse capitalism hypothesis in-
terprets the evidence as reﬂecting a multipeaked landscape with different
institutions producing more or less economic success in different periods.
In a multipeaked world, there is no real peak economy and thus it is no sur-
prise that one economy does better in one period and another in another
period. The adaptionist hypothesis makes the stronger claim that Japanese
institutions and policies ﬁt the 1980s environment whereas U.S. institu-
tions and policies ﬁt the 1990s environment. Developments in the early
2000s will support one explanation or the other. If the U.S. job boom
proves sustainable, the case that the United States has peak institutions
and policies for the information economy will be enhanced, lending sup-
port to the adaptionist claim. If the U.S. economy has a “hard landing,” we
will be comparing the 2000s fall of the United States as the economic won-
der to the 1990s fall of Japan as numero uno in the economic world,
strengthening the case for the diverse capitalism hypothesis. Given the
36 Richard B. Freemanpenchant that analysts have for picking a peak economy, there will un-
doubtedly be another changing of the guard.
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